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Abstract 
The South African government is exploring ways to address water scarcity problems by 
introducing a water resource management charge on the quantity of water used in sectors such 
as irrigated agriculture, mining and forestry. It is expected that a more efficient water 
allocation, lower use and a positive impact on poverty can be achieved. This paper reports on 
the validity of these claims by applying a computable general equilibrium model to analyse 
the triple dividend of water consumption charges in South Africa: reduced water use, more 
rapid economic growth, and a more equal income distribution. It is shown that the 
appropriate, budget-neutral combination of water charges, particularly on irrigated agriculture 









                                                 
 





Among South Africa’s many problems, water scarcity, poverty and an unequal income 
distribution loom large. The South African government is considering to reduce water use by 
levying charges. Less water scarcity is the first dividend of such a policy. The revenues from 
these water charges could be used to stimulate economic growth. This would be the second 
dividend. The double dividend literature (e.g., Goulder et al., 1997) shows that this requires 
careful policy design. Faster economic growth may well reduce absolute poverty. However, 
the tax revenues can also be used to change the income distribution. This would be the third 
dividend. It would require even more care in policy design. In this paper, we explore the three 
potentials dividends of water charges in South Africa. 
 
Above, we phrase water charges and revenue recycling in terms of triple dividends. This is in 
line with the economic literature. In business administration (e.g., Gray and Bebbington, 
2003), this is phrased as the triple bottom line: care for people (our third dividend), profit (our 
second) and the planet (our first). In the literature on sustainable development (e.g., Bell and 
Morse, 2003), the same question is phrased as the three pillars of sustainability, viz., 
environmental quality (planet), economic growth (profit), and social justice (people). To our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to assess all three pillars of sustainability using a single, 
consistent framework for analysis. 
 
This paper analyses the proposal of the South African government to reduce water 
consumption by introducing water resource management charges
2. The costs and benefits of 
these additional water charges to the South African economy are estimated with a particular 
emphasis on poverty reduction, through recycling the water charges revenue into higher real 
income to the poor
3. 
 
The literature on the use and availability of water, socio-economic indicators and water 
policies in South Africa is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on the concept of double 
dividend and its application to environmental taxation. The model and data used in this paper, 
                                                 
2 This is not a Pigouvian tax (Pigou, 1920); we analyse the water charges currently discussed by the government. 
  
  2including simulation results, are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  Water scarcity and poverty in South Africa 
 
South Africa is classified as a semi-arid country. Precipitation has fluctuated over the years 
(see Figure 1) with an average of 500 m
3 per annum, well below the world average of about 
860 mm per year (DWAF 2002). The total flow of all the rivers in the country amounts to 
approximately 49 200 million m³ per year. The National Water Resource Strategy estimates 
the total water requirement for the year 2000 at 13 280 million m
3, excluding environmental 
requirements. In addition, South Africa is poorly endowed with groundwater because most of 
the country is underlain by hard rock formations that do not contain any major groundwater 
aquifers (DWAF 2002).  
 
Figure 2 describes water requirements by sector in South Africa with the agricultural sector 
the largest consumer at 59 per cent. Large-scale farmers primarily use 95 per cent of irrigation 
water and small-scale farmers the remainder (Schreiner and van Koppen 2002). Afforestation 
requires 4 per cent of the total water requirement and rural and urban populations 4 per cent 
and 25 per cent, respectively. Mining and bulk industrial, and power generation use 8 per cent 
in aggregate.  
 
Water resources are essential to transform society towards social and environmental justice 
and poverty eradication (Schreiner and van Koppen 2002). Rural people require water for 
drinking, hygiene, cooking and for productive purposes such as farming, livestock, forestry, 
fisheries and small-scale industries to deal with income poverty. Almost 50 per cent of the 
South African population is poor in terms of income, spending less than R353 per adult 
equivalent per month and about 70 per cent of these poor live in rural areas (Schreiner and 
van Koppen 2002). 
 
Table 1 demonstrates a number of selected socio-economic indicators in South Africa in 
2001. About 23 per cent of the rural population depend on remittances and pensions, and 32 
per cent depend on pensions and grants. In addition, approximately only 24 per cent of rural 
people have access to piped water on site, while only 15 per cent have access to sanitation. An 
additional charge on water used by economic sectors might lead to more effective allocation, 
  3a lower use of water resources and a positive impact on poverty alleviation. It translates into 
more water available for drinking, hygiene and productive activities, which might increase 
income for the poor and reduce the number of people affected by poverty. However, this 
study only addresses poverty reduction options and not inequality. 
 
The above discussion demonstrates the scarcity of water in South Africa as well as the 
prevalence of poverty. The next question is how water resources are managed. To that effect, 
consensus was reached at the Dublin Conference on Water and the Environment that water 
should be regarded as an economic good (Briscoe 1996, Savenije and van der Zaag 2001, 
Perry et al. 1997). There are two schools of thought on the economic value of water (Savenije 
and van der Zaag 2001, Perry et al. 1997). The first school maintains that water should be 
allocated to its best uses by being priced at its economic value - the same as other private 
goods that are allocated through competitive market pricing. The second school maintains that 
water should be exempted from competitive market pricing and treated as a basic human 
need, which does not necessarily involve financial transactions. This paper adopts the position 
that water should be priced at its economic value, while still ensuring access to water 
resources to poor people. The value of water is the maximum amount water users are willing 
to pay for the use of this resource such that marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal 
(Briscoe 1996 and Perry et al, 2001).  
 
In South Africa, according to the National Water Act (Act No 36 of 1998), the government is 
regarded as the public trustee of the nation's water resources and “must ensure that water is 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable 
manner, for the benefit of all persons” (MacKay 2003). Under previous legislation in South 
Africa, pricing of water did not generally take into account the real cost of managing water, 
the cost of water supply and the scarcity value of water (MacKay 2003:64). The government 
financed the capital costs of their water schemes supplying agricultural water users, some 
urban bulk water suppliers and industrial users. In addition, operation and maintenance costs 
are often not fully recovered from these water users (MacKay 2003:64-65). 
 
The principle behind current water pricing policy in South Africa is that payment for water 
should be at a level reflecting its scarcity except for water required to meet basic human 
needs. Currently 25 litres of water per day per person is assumed to meet these needs. The 
pricing policy is structured into three tiers (CSIR 2001): 
  4-  First tier: raw water tariffs administered by DWAF for the sale of water to Water 
Boards. 
-  Second tier: water boards set the wholesale price of water to bulk water users like 
municipalities and industries such as Eskom and Sasol. 
-  Third tier: municipalities determine the price of water to charge end-users such as 
households and industries.  
 
A rise in raw water tariffs will automatically lead to an increase in the price in the second and 
third tiers. According to the Water Act, all water users should be registered and pay for the 
water. Water use is classified into three kinds: schedule 1 authorisation, which grants lawful 
access for reasonable domestic use; small gardening and livestock watering without paying 
water tariffs or charges; general authorisation – by which water use is authorised for a group 
of water users as long as certain minimum requirements are met; and water use licence – 
individual water users should apply to DWAF for a licence to use water, and where water 
should preferably be allocated to those users generating the highest social, economic or 
environmental value and equity.  
 
Water pricing can be based on a number of pricing strategies that include full supply cost, full 
economic cost and full cost of water (Figure 3). The South African government is introducing 
a water resource management charge to recover some of the costs for water management and 
to reflect water scarcity in the country. This means that the government is moving towards 




3  Double dividend: A literature review 
 
According to the double dividend theory, the revenues of environmental taxes can be used to 
lower other (distortionary) taxes, and therefore lower the economic cost of the environmental 
tax. The positive effects of lowering other taxes could even outweigh the negative effects of a 
rise in environmental taxes. This is when the double dividend occurs: both the environment 
(first dividend) and the economy (second dividend) will be in better shape than before the 
environmental tax reform. Policy-makers who want to use environmental taxes to curb 
  5pollution, but find it hard to sell a drop in GDP or employment would of course, welcome 
this. It also explains why the double dividend theory has become a popular research theme. 
 
In the early phases of the double dividend theory, bold statements were made about the 
general validity or invalidity of the theory. These statements were, respectively, based on 
partial models of the economy and simple one-factor GE models that assumed competitive 
markets (see e.g. Pearce (1991) and Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994)). Later analysis focused 
on multiple production factor models and allowed for a distorted labour market. This analysis 
led to more nuanced statements about the possibility of a double dividend and will be 
discussed in the next two sections. 
 
3.1  Multiple production factors 
  
The one-factor models claimed it was impossible to attain a double dividend because the 
environmental tax would be more distortionary (just looking from an economic viewpoint and 
abstaining from environmental benefits) than the factor tax it replaced (Bovenberg and de 
Mooij, 1994; Goulder et al., 1997). Adding another production factor (usually capital; the 
one-factor models used only labour) to the modelled economy introduced the possibility of 
inefficiencies in the tax system. From a tax-efficiency point of view taxes on the two 
production factors should have the same marginal efficiency costs or marginal excess burden 
(MEB), that is the loss of overall production efficiency due to taxation
4. If the MEBs are not 
the same, reducing this difference reduces the distortions in the economy caused by taxation.  
 
In the double dividend literature this inefficiency is "used" to create possible economic gains 
from the introduction of an environmental tax. This happens if the environmental tax shifts 
the tax burden from the over-taxed factor (with the higher MEB) to the under-taxed factor 
(with the lower MEB). As stated by Goulder (1994), the gain is larger if (i) the difference in 
MEBs is larger; (ii) the burden of the environmental tax falls mainly on the under-taxed 
factor; and (iii) the recycling of revenues mainly reduces the burden of the over-taxed factor.  
 
                                                 
4   The MEB of a labour tax depends on its level and on the (compensated) wage elasticity of labour 
supply: the larger this elasticity, the greater the distortion. For a capital tax in a closed economy it is again its 
level and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption: the larger the elasticity, the larger the 
distortion along the intertemporal dimension (the margin of choice between consuming today and consuming in 
future). 
  6Substitution elasticities between labour, capital and water (the scarce resource) are also 
important. With capital fixed, this factor should be a poor substitute for water, while labour 
should be a good substitute. With an elastic capital supply, it is the other way around (De 
Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998). 
 
This efficiency gain has to be large enough to overcome the negative effects that are inherent 
to an environmental tax (its narrowness, and the extra distortionary costs that arise from 
taxing inputs or goods instead of taxing production factors directly)
5. 
 
The effects of tax shifting have also been studied with empirical GE models. Goulder (1995), 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) all study the results of a 
revenue neutral environmental tax reform for the United States with an intertemporal 
numerical GE analysis. Goulder (1995), and Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) fail to find a 
double dividend. In all their scenarios the environmental tax is more distortionary than the 
taxes it replaces and the economic costs of the tax reform are therefore always positive. The 
main reason for this is the relative narrowness of the environmental tax. Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1993) do find a double dividend under certain conditions. Irrespective of the end 
result, the costs or benefits of the tax reform varied with the scenario chosen, and they moved 
in line with Goulders' (1994) expectations: the costs were lower, the larger the difference in 
MEB, and the more the tax burden was shifted from the over-taxed to the under-taxed factor.  
 
3.2  Non-competitive markets: involuntary unemployment 
 
The second main improvement to the double dividend analysis was the inclusion of 
involuntary unemployment. In the literature involuntary unemployment has been incorporated 
in the GE analysis in several different ways, but usually some model of wage bargaining 
between firms and workers is used. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998), for instance, use a 
search model of the labour market with individual worker-firm bargaining. In another paper 
Strand (1998) assumes a monopoly union that unilaterally determines the wage, after which a 
fixed number of firms determine employment. In Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998) a 
                                                 
5   The broader the tax base the lower the distortion. Environmental taxes, however, are relatively narrow 
by nature and on purpose because they are meant to change specific behaviour (Goulder, 1994). In the theoretical 
tax literature, taxes on intermediate inputs generally have larger welfare costs than do equal-revenue taxes on 
primary factors because they distort both the intermediate input choice and factor markets, instead of just 
distorting factor markets (Goulder, 1995: 288). 
  7monopolistic firm determines employment, this time after bargaining over wages with a small 
trade union. 
 
In these papers, a double dividend depends on the effect of the green tax reform on the 
bargaining positions of firms and workers. For employment (not necessarily welfare) to 
increase, producer wages have to decrease, and this happens if workers' bargaining position 
deteriorates or that of the firm(s) improve. This is the case if workers' outside options (e.g. 
income under unemployment or in the informal sector) worsens or if the firm's labour demand 
becomes more elastic with respect to wages. Another way to reduce wages is to shift the tax 
burden to the unemployed as is done in the paper by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998). 
 
3.3 Distributional  effects 
 
Besides raising revenue, the most important function of taxation is the (re)distribution of 
income between members of society. This distribution is also the main reason why tax 
systems deviate from optimality (in the absence of externalities it would be optimal to have a 
lump sum tax). Unfortunately, the way an environmental tax reform affects distribution is not 
studied in much detail in the double dividend literature. The scarce information we do have 
points in the direction of a small negative distributional effect, but this, of course, depends on 




Shifting the tax burden to the unemployed or those working in the informal sector, as is done 
in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) to increase employment, will obviously have negative 
income effects on the lowest income groups.  
 
Concluding, a double dividend seems possible but is by no means certain or automatic. The 
initial situation regarding existing taxes and distortions in the labour market, together with the 
specific form of the tax reform, will determine the ultimate outcome. In policy terms, a double 
dividend can be achieved if the tax reform is smart. Tax reforms that ignore pre-existing 
distortions but are designed on alternative criteria (e.g., political considerations) would 
probably not result in a double dividend. By extrapolation, a third dividend (income 
distribution in our case) would place even greater demands on policy design. 
  8 
4  Model, data and scenarios 
 
The model used here is called UPGEM, which stands for the University of Pretoria 
Computable General Equilibrium Model of South Africa. It is similar to the computable 
general equilibrium ORANI-G model of the Australian economy, and is written and solved 
using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson 1996), a flexible system for solving CGE models. It 
is a static model with an overall Leontief production structure, and CES sub-structures for (i) 
the choice between labour, capital and land, (ii) the choice between the different labour types 
in the model, and (iii) the choice between imported and domestic inputs into the production 
process. Household demand is modelled as a linear expenditure system that differentiates 
between necessities and luxury goods, while households’ choice between imported and 
domestic goods is modelled using the CES structure. 
 
The model is based on the official 1998 social accounting matrix (SAM) of South Africa, 
published by StatsSA (SSA 2001). This SAM divides households in 12 income and four 
ethnic groups, and distinguishes 27 sectors. For the purpose of this study, the energy and 
water intensive sectors are split further to arrive at 39 sectors. The elasticities used for the 
CES functions in the model have been taken from De Wet (2003). The model’s closure rules 
reflect a short-run time horizon. The capital stock is assumed fixed, while the rate of return on 
capital is allowed to change. Labour supply is modelled in the typical ORANI way, by 
assuming fixed real wages in the short run, implying perfectly elastic labour supply. The 
supply of land is also assumed inelastic. 
 
With reference to the macroeconomic variables, it is assumed that aggregate investment, 
government consumption and inventories are exogenous, while consumption and the trade 
balance are endogenous. Consumption is a function of post-tax wage income by household 
and race group, while imports and exports have CES demand functions of relative prices. This 
specification allows us insight into the effect of the suggested policies on South Africa’s 
consumption and competitiveness. All technological change variables and all tax rates are 
exogenous in the closure. Finally, the nominal exchange rate is set to be the numeraire in each 
of the simulations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
6   However, this would again diminish the increased efficiency of the tax system and could, depending on 
the measures taken, forestall a double dividend.  
  9The water supply and use accounts of the CSIR (2001) were used to create a vector of 
“Taxable water” for each industry in the SAM, as well as a vector of “Extra water charges” 
that may be charged on volumes of water used. The former is a vector of water volumes that 
include all taxable water, namely water extracted from underground or rivers, or water 
received from the formal water sector. Variables are also defined for taxable water used, and 
extra water charges, to be able to calculate changes in total revenue raised, and changes in 
water demand. 
 
The core water equation added to the UPGEM model (2b) is derived as the revenue raised is 
equal to the rate per volume times the volume of water (X): 
  
    R   =   T . X          ( 1 )  
 
UPGEM works in percentage or absolute change form, and not in absolute levels. From 
equation (1) above the change in revenue (dR) is approximately equal to the tax rate (T) times 
the change in the base (dX) plus the base (X) times the change in the rate (dT):  
 
   dR = T.dX + X.dT = T.X.x/100+X.dT = R.x/100+X.dT         (2b) 
 
with x the percentage change in X
7. Equation (2) is used in the model to calculate the absolute 
changes in revenue received from charges on water consumption by all industries. The 
changes in the tax rates are exogenous, and shocked according to various scenarios outlined 
below. All the other variables are entered into, or calculated by the model. Note that variable 
x is the percentage change in water consumption by industries, and it is an endogenous 
variable, that is, calculated by the model. We expect that an additional charge on water will 
lead to a decrease in water consumption. Total revenue from the extra water charges is added 
to total government revenue. 
 
The following scenarios were tested using the UPGEM model to try and adhere to the 
suggestions proposed by water authorities and experts: 
(i)  A surcharge of 10c per m
3 water used by forestry; 
(ii)  A surcharge of 10c per m
3 water used by irrigated agriculture; and 
(iii)  A surcharge of 10c per m
3 water used by all mining industries. 
                                                 
7 If x is the percentage change in X, then we know x = 100*dX/X, so that dX = x.X/100 
  10On the recycling side three simulations were performed: 
(iv)  A decrease in the overall level of direct taxation on capital and labour;  
(v)  A decrease in the overall level of sales tax on household consumption; and  
(vi)  A decrease in the sales tax rate on food to households. 
 
No unambiguous improvement in consumption levels of all race groups in the poorest three 
household groups was found by any one of the scenarios, so that we had to refine the 
scenarios further. Irrigated agriculture was split into field crops and horticulture, and the 
results reported separately. Mining was also split into three components – gold, coal, and 
other mining – and results are reported separately as well. 
 
This results in eight scenarios of water chargers, and three scenarios of revenue recycling. 
Rather than simulating 8x3=24 scenarios, we use the additive property of a CGE under small 
shocks. To this end, we normalised the water consumption, economic growth and income 
distribution effects of the water charge scenarios by the respective revenues, and did the same 
thing for the revenue scenarios. The impact of water charge plus recycling is closely 
approximated by the sum of the impact of water charge and the impact of revenue recycling. 
 
4.3 Simulation  results 
4.3.1 Environmental  effects 
 
The first of the dividends is the environmental dividend reaped. 
  11 below illustrates that all the simulations do yield the first dividend, whether the revenue 
collected is recycled through a direct or indirect tax break. The first dividend here is a net 
decrease in the amount of water consumed per unit of real government revenue. Additional 
charge on water consumption always leads to a decrease in water demand. All needed for the 
environmental dividend to occur is that the increase in water consumption that results from a 
direct or indirect tax break is less than the decrease due to the water charge. The model results 
as shown in 
  12 indicate that this is expected to be the case. 
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The water charge increases the price of water and directly affects the amount of water 
consumed. The model predicts that the water charge will lead to a decline in water 
consumption in the forestry and irrigated agriculture sector by 32 per cent and 6 per cent per 
billion Rand tax revenue received, respectively. Water consumption by the mining sector will 
decrease by only 3 per cent per billion Rand. The decrease in water consumption as a result of 
water charge is greater than an increase in water consumption because of tax breaks, thereby 
yielding the environmental dividend. However, a tax break affects all commodities, not only 
water. Consumers will use the extra income to demand more of all commodities, including 
water. However, water is a necessity, and the demand for it will increase very little, as the 
results in table show. 
 
4.3.2 Economic  effects 
 
The second dividend is the effect on the total economy, and is determined using the concept 
of marginal excess burden. The marginal excess burden (MEB) is defined as: 
  MEB = change in real GDP divided by the change in real government revenue 
 
The MEB’s for all eight water charge policy measures as well as the three recycling measures 
are given in Table 3 below, and compared. A double dividend is indicated by a + in the table, 
when the increase in real GDP per unit of real government revenue lost as a result of a tax 
break (recycling policy) is larger than the decrease in real GDP per unit of real government 
revenue collected from a new water charge. 
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A charge on water consumed by the mining industry led to a decrease in real GDP by 54.7 
cents per Rand of real government revenue collected from the tax. Recycling via a direct or 
indirect tax break or a tax break on food led to a GDP increase by 58.6, 72.2 and 70.3 cents 
per Rand of real government revenue forsaken by government respectively. This gives a net 
gain to the economy. However, if only gold mining were paying the water charge, it would 
not render a double dividend, and neither would coal mining with the direct tax break as 
method of recycling. Other mining industries give quite a different result from coal and gold 
mining in that GDP only decreases by 25 cents per Rand extra water charged. An additional 
charge on water consumption by irrigated agriculture renders double dividends, whether the 
tax is levied on field crops only, or horticultural crops, or on both. The damage done in terms 
of MEB is smaller with field crops than horticulture. However, none of the three recycling 
schemes is able to undo the damage of additional water charges on forestry.  
 
The percentage change in total employment per unit of real government revenue collected was 
also calculated, and the plusses and minuses follow exactly the same pattern as in Table 3 
above. That is, employment and GDP per unit of real government revenue are closely related 
to each other. The explanation is simply that the total production function in the model has 
Leontief and CES characteristics in terms of intermediate and primary inputs, so that GDP 
and employment will always move in the same direction as a result of an exogenous shock.  
  
4.3.3 Poverty  effects 
 
The criterion used to measure an improvement in poverty levels is the percentage change in 
total real consumption of the three poorest household groups in the economy, by race. The 
model has eleven household groups and four race groups and it calculates consumption for 
each group by commodity, as well as total consumption. The results of total consumption for 
the poorest household group is given in Table 4, but the results for the poorest three groups 
are similar, so that the table would be representative of all three also. 
 
We found that some policy combinations render a net improvement for one race group while 
they have detrimental effects on another. The only water charge that could be recycled 
through a general direct or indirect tax break, in a way that would benefit all four race groups 
within the poorest groups of households, is a tax on water consumption by mining industries 
  15other than gold and coal. However, all the environmental taxes except one would render the 
poverty dividend if they are combined with a tax break on food.  
 
On the irrigated agriculture side it helps much to differentiate between water charge on field 
crops and on horticultural crops separately. We found that a tax on irrigated horticultural 
crops has a more severe influence on the consumption of the poorest groups, in that at least 
one group is made worse off with this tax, while with irrigated field crops at most one group 
is made worse off.  
 
 
5 Discussion  of  results 
 
Extra water charges on forestry are detrimental to three of the four race groups in the poorest 
household group, including Africans who comprise close to 90 per cent of this group. The 
eight key commodities that Africans spend the most of their income on are – in order of 
importance - food, petroleum, real estate, textiles, electricity, transport services, other 
manufacturing and agricultural goods.  
 
The direct impact of extra water charges on forestry is firstly an increase in the cost of the 
forestry industry and hence its prices, and secondly on wood, paper and pulp, which is part of 
other manufacturing. The agricultural sector is the largest intermediate supplier to the food 
industry, and food is the most important commodity to all households – rich and poor. Other 
manufacturing is also high on poor consumers’ priority list, and these two channels turn out to 
be significant in having the detrimental effect on the poor.  
 
Extra water charges on mining do not have a direct effect on households in the same way as 
on forestry and irrigated agriculture. Households do buy some coal, but no gold or other 
mining goods, so that there are no direct effects on households from the latter two industries. 
They influence consumers through the downstream effects on industries who buy the outputs 
of the mining industries.  
 
The effect from the mining industry as a whole comes mostly from more expensive coal, 
through two obvious channels. African households consume coal directly, and they consume 
much electricity, for which coal is the most important intermediate input. The gold mining 
industry has indirect effects only: it sells gold to other manufacturing, which is a key 
  16commodity for households. Three of its most important suppliers of intermediate goods are 
petroleum, electricity and other manufacturing – all three key commodities for the poor. 
 
The results that appear in Table 4 also take into consideration recycling, and the effects 
described above should be compared to the increases in consumption of various commodities 
due to recycling. In general the recycling benefits all industries, while the environmental taxes 
harm a few industries severely, and affecting others marginally. The recycling of revenue 
allows consumers to have more of all commodities, and hence also more of all their key 
commodities of which they consume the most. The default net outcome of the combined 
policy options – water charges and recycling – should therefore be beneficial to the 
consumers, unless the environmental effects are focused on a few key commodities, and 
outweigh the recycling effects. The extra water charges on other mining are a case in point. 
There is no direct negative effect on consumers since they do not buy other mining 
commodities. The most important indirect effects are on petroleum, basic iron and steel and 
construction, of which only the first is important on the consumers’ list. Hence the results 
demonstrate positive net effects on consumption by the poor for all three recycling schemes. 
 
Extra water charges on irrigated agriculture directly increase the cost of field and horticultural 
production. Field and horticultural products comprise a large proportion of agricultural 
commodities, and an increase in their prices directly affects the prices of industries buying 
them as intermediate inputs. The four largest demanders of agricultural goods are food, other 
manufacturing, petroleum and textiles, all important to poor households. The only recycling 
scheme that is able to offset the decrease in consumption due to water charges on agriculture, 
is a decrease in the food tax rate. Food is the most important consumer good for poor 
households, and it is to be expected that cheaper food would dominate the tax on an industry 
only indirectly linked to poor households.  
 
The good news with a water charge policy that involves irrigated field crops is that Africans 
are made better off, despite the way of recycling used. They comprise more than 89 per cent 
of total consumption in their six most important commodities, and a very high proportion of 
all commodities consumed by the poorest groups. The Coloureds consume less than 10 per 
cent of all commodities in the poorest group and is the only group to be harmed by a tax on 
irrigated field crops.  
 
  17All the simulation results are summarised in Table 5. The first plus in each cell shows the first 
dividend, namely the environmental effect, which is positive in all cases. The second plus or 
minus shows whether a double dividend on GDP and employment has been achieved with the 
combination of policies, while the third plus or minus shows a triple dividend on poverty 
reduction. There are quite a number of policy combinations that render double dividends, but 
we are interested in poverty reduction with environmental management. With both a direct tax 
break and a general decrease in the sales tax rate for households, the only triple dividends are 
obtained through a water charge on Other Mining. However, six of the eight environmental 
tax policy measures render triple dividends with a decrease in the tax rate on food to 
households. 
 
  18  
6 Conclusion 
 
The simulation results presented in this paper are satisfactory. The large water users are 
irrigated agriculture and it is (politically) important that a tax on water used by irrigated 
agriculture would render the desired triple dividends for all four-race groups, if the revenue is 
properly recycled. A tax of irrigated agriculture does render double dividends with all three 
recycling schemes (direct taxes, indirect taxes, food faxes), and a triple dividend with the one 
of the three (food taxes). An additional water charge on the mining sector, particularly coal 
and other mining, stand a high chance of yielding dividends in terms of less water used, 
positive impacts on poverty reduction amongst the poor and positive impacts on the economy. 
Again, a reduction in indirect taxes, particularly on food, is more effective than a reduction of 
direct taxation. A more detailed analysis with more specific charges needs to be carried out to 
further substantiate this conclusion. 
 
We show that there can be a triple dividend of water policy, simultaneously reducing water 
scarcity, improving economic growth, and reducing poverty. Smart policy design could 
improve all three pillars of sustainability, viz. the environment (planet), the economy (profit), 
and society (people). Methodologically, this study goes beyond water in South Africa. Water 
is but one environmental problem, and South Africa is among many countries in which 
environment, economic and social problems coincide. The methods used in this paper could 
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  21TABLE 1  Selected socio-economic indicators: 2001 
  National Rural 
Unemployment rate (%):    
Official (restricted) definition  26.4 33.9 
Unofficial (expanded) definition  37.0  52.2 
Portion of household (%):    
with piped water in the dwelling or on site  65.7  24.3 
using mainly wood for cooking  19.6  53.8 
using mainly electricity for cooking  52.5  18.3 
using mainly paraffin for cooking  21.1  19.2 
with access to hygienic sanitation 62.2  18.0 
where refuse / rubbish is removed by a local authority  54.8  15.5 
with access to telephone  33.7  22.3 
within 14 minutes of nearest clinic  36.3  20.8 
within 14 minutes of nearest primary school  54.3  41.7 
within 14 minutes of nearest food market  50.9  40.1 
dependent on remittances   13.8  23.5 
dependent on pensions and grants   17.8  32.2 
with a radio  79.1  72.2 
with a TV  56.4  35.0 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2002) 
  22TABLE 2  Marginal change in water consumption, and an indication of scenarios that 
result in a water dividend (numbers present % change water per 10 million Rand tax revenue) 
    Recycling scheme 






Environmental tax   0.0007  0.0009  0.0009 
Tax on Forestry water  0.316  +  +  + 
Tax on Mining water  0.026  +  +  + 
 Gold mining  0.028  +  +  + 
 Coal mining  0.026  +  +  + 
 Other mining  0.025  +  +  + 
Tax on Irrigated Agriculture  0.055  +  +  + 
 Field crops  0.066  +  +  + 
 Horticulture  0.033  +  +  + 
 
  23TABLE 3  Marginal excess burdens of different tax instruments, for GDP, and an 
indication of scenarios that result in a GDP dividend 
    Recycling scheme 






Environmental tax   0.586  0.722  0.703 
Tax on Forestry water  0.825  –  –  – 
Tax on Mining water  0.547  +  +  + 
 Gold mining  0.964  –  –  – 
 Coal mining  0.658  –  +  + 
 Other mining  0.249  +  +  + 
Tax on Irrigated Agriculture  0.372  +  +  + 
 Field crops  0.338  +  +  + 
 Horticulture  0.442  +  +  + 
 
  24TABLE 4  Marginal change in poverty (% change in real consumption of poorest 
household group per billion Rand tax revenue), and an indication of scenarios that result in a 
poverty dividend 
    Recycling scheme 






Environmental tax   0.104  0.133  0.403 
Tax on Forestry water  0.291  –  –  + 
Tax on Mining water  0.285  –  –  + 
 Gold mining  0.568  –  –  – 
 Coal mining  0.268  –  –  + 
 Other mining  0.092  +  +  + 
Tax on Irrigated Agriculture  0.196  –  –  + 
 Field crops  0.175  –  –  + 
 Horticulture  0.239  –  –  + 
 
  25TABLE 5  Summary of dividends (greenhouse gas emissions, GDP and employment, and 
poverty)  
    Recycling scheme 






Environmental tax        
Tax on Forestry water    + – –  + – –  + – + 
Tax on Mining water    + + –  + + –  + + + 
 Gold mining    + – –  + – –  + – – 
 Coal mining    + – –  + + –  + + + 
 Other mining    + + +  + + +  + + + 
Tax on Irrigated Agriculture    + + –  + + –  + + + 
 Field crops    + + –  + + –  + + + 
 Horticulture    + + –  + + –  + + + 
 



























Source: CSIR (2001). 















Source: DWAF (2002) 
  28Figure 3: Underlying principles for the cost and value of water 
Source: King (2004), adapted from Rogers, de Silva and Bhatia (2001) 
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